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FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF PAUL.

I PROPOSE to put down here certain thoughts which have struck me about the teaching of Paul. I shall assume with Pfleiderer and Weizsäcker that the genuine epistles are 1 Thessalonians, Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans, Philippians. I am wholly unqualified to judge whether the remaining epistles are Pauline or not. This only I may say: After reading the former epistles a great many times through, I read the Ephesians and Colossians, and I seemed to be transported into another world. A great step further seemed to have been taken in the deification of Christ.

The Epistles of Paul fill a new comer with immense astonishment. They are so unique. They are so wholly unlike anything else he has ever read. When I read the Synoptic Gospels I do not feel this utter unlikeness. Great as Jesus is, his teaching seems in many respects to be what one might expect a new Amos to say at such a time. His attitude towards the Jews and towards the Law does not seem hard to understand. There is originality, there is genius, there is religious and moral splendour, there does not seem to be a totally new departure. And even the Fourth Gospel, when I think of it as a product of Hebraism and Hellenism—a product composed by a great genius, but still a product—even this great Fourth Gospel seems to me something which one might possibly expect. But Paul—even if, as Pfleiderer so ably argues, he is a mixture of Greek and Hebrew—still, why should any such mixture produce *him*? His conception of the Law, his theory of Christ, his views about Israel, his doctrine of justification, seem all not only original, but utterly strange and unexpected. His break with the past

is violent. Jesus seems to expand and spiritualise Judaism. Paul in some senses turns it upside down.

The Jewish Christians' contention with the Jews of their time was almost exclusively confined to the person and office of Jesus ; but Paul breaks away from Judaism in everything, in his conception of the Law, of Israel, of the Gentiles, of sin, and of goodness. The teaching of Jesus would have been perfectly intelligible to his contemporaries ; the premisses from which he and they started are largely the same. But with Paul the reverse is the case ; his premisses are quite different from the premisses of the Jews, and a great deal of what he said must have been utterly unintelligible to them. Neither could have understood the other. They move upon different planes. And yet Paul was a Jew, and started from Judaism. The puzzle is therefore all the more puzzling. For certainly the most orthodox and average Jew can *understand* the Synoptics, however much they may annoy him ; he cannot possibly, on the mere basis of his Judaism, understand Paul. It is as if, for example, one man was to give a lecture to another man upon the properties of a certain geometrical shape, but their eyes were so differently constituted that the shape which seemed to the eyes of the lecturer to be a square, seemed to the listener to be a circle. The lecturer's deductions and theories would seem unintelligible and absurd to the listener. So it must have been, so indeed it is, with Paul and the Jews as regards the conception of the Law.

Again, there seems no disguising the great differences of view between Paul and Jesus, and this difference is acknowledged and brought out by Cone in his excellent book, *The Gospel and its Earliest Interpretations*. Paul was a disciple of Jesus, in so far as the Messiahship and Crucifixion and Resurrection were concerned ; but to the teaching of Jesus, as such, he rarely alludes. And Paul, moreover, however much such modern theologians as Weizsäcker may eulogise him, seems very far apart from them in his

theories and beliefs. He seems further away from the modern Broad Churchman than Jesus, or even than the author of the Fourth Gospel.

Paul's religion is essentially connected with his entire *Weltanschauung*. It is all part and parcel of a huge philosophy of history and religion, of a conception of the universe and its destiny, according to the idea of a universe at that time. Moreover, as he thought, the crisis of the world's history had just arrived. It had begun with the birth of Jesus; it had culminated in his crucifixion and resurrection, and it would reach its consummation in the Second Advent, and in the final overthrow of Death. Paul was partly the witness of this crisis, partly its preacher, and hence, too, in one sense, he was partly its fulfiller.

I propose now to glance at various elements and aspects of Paul's religion. The order I follow will be mainly one of convenience.

Paul's conception of the world, as of his whole philosophy of religion, starts from and ends with God. In this he resembles every other Jew. God is the Creator. I should imagine that Paul believed that while God was eternal in both directions, Christ, although pre-existent before his human birth, was yet created by God. There was God before there was Christ. Christ had a beginning, God had none. In the assumed genuine epistles Paul does not apparently assert or imply the co-eternity or the co-equality of Christ with God. And the end of the world-drama is that "God may be all in all."

I cannot discover much that is original in Paul's conception of God, or of God's character and attributes. Of course, there is the magnificent and novel doctrine of God being the God of the Gentile as well as of the Jew. But this is apart from the character of God as such. Here I find nothing better than what I find in the best Psalms, and nothing so good as what I find in the Synoptic Gospels. Paul is convinced that God loves man, and that the purpose

of God is that man should be saved. But in this, apart from questions of national limitations, he does not go beyond Ezekiel, the Psalter and the Wisdom of Solomon.

Now, passing straightway from God to man (though in order of time Christ, as pre-existent, would come before man), Paul retains the same two great divisions which were familiar to him before his conversion. Humanity is composed of Jews and Gentiles. It is in their relation to God that Paul's great pre-eminence, his big religious advance, his most permanent contribution to religion, consist. God is the God of all in a real sense. He is interested in all men of every race. The prerogatives of the Jews are broken down. Before God and in Christ all are equal, and through Christ all may win a salvation in which the Jew takes no precedence over the Gentile. "There is no respect of persons with God." The great array of noble passages on this point speak for themselves. They need not here be cited; they need only be thankfully acknowledged. The prophetic universalism has reached its goal.¹

But though the wall of separation and cleavage between Jew and Gentile is broken down, and though the purpose of God is that a full salvation should be within the reach and opportunity of all, yet it is also true that in the eyes of Paul nobody has ever known or worshipped the true God up till his own time except his fellow-countrymen, the Jews. Why is this? How is this curious fact to be explained? What had happened to the Gentiles that they were ignorant of God?

In the answer which we may draw from Paul to these questions, we shall find that he partly follows the current theology of his time and partly deviates from it. In this, as in many other things, Paul is not always consistent. His inconsistency is well pointed out by Pfleiderer, whose explanation of it here, as elsewhere, rests

¹ Rom. i. 16, ii. 9-15, iii. 29-31, xi. 12; Gal. iii. 28; 1 Cor. vii. 19, xii. 13, etc.

on the double source from which Paul, in spite of his originality and genius, drew upon for his theology. First, Rabbinic Judaism; secondly, Hellenism, such as we find it in the Wisdom of Solomon. One must also remember that Paul believed the Old Testament to be the word of God and wholly true. However much his interpretation of the Law may seem to us to do violence to the Law, it nevertheless assumes that the Law was given by God, and that the scriptural history is both accurate and inspired.

The Gentile world then does not know God, and is not known of him. Was this their fault or not? It would seem that Paul gave partially different answers to this question at different times. The answer in the Galatians, or rather the answer which we may infer from the Galatians, does not exactly correspond with the more deliberate and formal answer in the first chapters of the Romans. In the Galatians the ignorance of the Gentiles would seem to be less their fault than their misfortune; in the Romans, less their misfortune than their fault. But as both misfortune and fault, from another point of view, were equally predetermined by God for his own good purposes, the two answers are not so far apart as might appear at first sight. Still they are different answers, as can be seen in Pfeiderer.¹

From the Galatians it would appear as if the Gentiles were in a state of ignorance of God till the time came when God should make himself known to them, that is, till the age of Christ and Paul. They were spiritually children: the coming of Christ marked alike the period of their manhood and their redemption. In the epistle in which Paul's antagonism to the Jews is emphasised most strongly, it is perhaps not unnatural that his judgment of the Gentiles should be the gentlest. The ethical difficulty which we see in this long period of ignorance and childhood, even if all the Gentile world had been converted to

¹ *Das Urchristenthum*, pp. 192-200.

the true God at the age of Paul, was as wholly unapparent to as it was left wholly unexplained by the apostle. Nor are we given any suggestion as to the fate of these many generations of Gentiles from Adam to Paul after their death. Nor are we told whether their ignorance of God had, or had not, any hurtful effect and influence upon their moral character. We must, however, be prepared for many gaps in Paul's theology as well as many unsolved difficulties. We can only repeat with full agreement those words of his which imply that the problems of existence are insoluble. "How unsearchable are God's judgments, and his ways past tracing out."

But let us now turn to the more elaborate teaching of the Epistle to the Romans. Here the ignorance of the Gentiles is set down to their own fault. They might have inferred God from the natural light of reason, but they wilfully became idolators. Moreover, idolatry begat sin. And so they have continued till Paul's own time, the slaves of idolatry and the slaves of sin. This argument is contained in the first chapter of the Epistle. Again, it is useless to ask why was man allowed to sin, or so created that he was likely to sin (for as we shall subsequently see in the pre-Christian constitution of man, sin was almost inevitable). You can only answer along Pauline lines that God "shut up all into disobedience that he might have mercy upon all." He allowed the sin to increase that great might be the redemption. Whether this wide redemption was justly obtained by the suffered sin or perdition (*ἀπώλεια*) of those who had lived and died before it came, is a modern difficulty which did not suggest itself to the Apostle.

Closely following the author of the Wisdom of Solomon, he also represents the earliest generations of men as "knowing God." But in their vain wisdom and self-conceit they went astray, so that "knowing God, they glorified him not as God, neither gave thanks; but became vain in their reasonings, and their senseless heart was

darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man, and of birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things." The first consequence was sexual immorality, and the second every kind of wickedness and vice. Thus, from this point of view, the idolator is also a sinner. To Paul, in one of his moods, the two terms, as to the mind of the ordinary Jew, are almost identical.

But alongside of this theoretical explanation of Gentile sin there runs another, which dovetails with it only partly, and starts from a totally different premiss. According to this explanation, the date at which sin entered into the world was prior to the beginning of idolatry. It began with Adam. The first man's sin let loose the power of sin, so that, until that power was supernaturally broken, "through the one man's disobedience the many became sinners." Every man necessarily became a sinner; every man was bound to sin, because Adam sinned. But the complication is by no means finished. For what is sin? The obvious answer to a Jew would be, "Sin is breaking the commands of God"; and as the commands of God are contained in the Law, he could equally say, "Sin is breaking the enactments of the Law." If, then, the Gentiles have no commands of God, and possess no Law, how can they be said to "sin"? This is a real difficulty, and Paul answers it in more than one way. The intimate connection of sin with the law, indicated in the question just raised, is a most vital part of his entire theology. But common sense could not allow him to say that there was no sin in the Gentile world, just as the universalism of his doctrine, triumphing over Jewish prepossessions, enabled him to see that there were good men among the Gentiles as well as bad. He therefore asserts, on the one hand, that you can sin without law; and, moreover, that "as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law"; but, on the other hand, that both Gentile

and Jew can "work good," and reap for themselves "glory and honour and peace," nay even, by "patience in well-doing" receive "eternal life." As regards the Gentiles, he bases this opinion upon the theory that "when the Gentiles which have no law do by nature the things of the law, these, having no law, are a law unto themselves." This most interesting and important passage runs counter, as we shall see, to Paul's central theory of man's incapacity to do good without the Divine Spirit, the bestowal of which dates from Christ, and it may perhaps be justifiably used to prevent too hard and too violent consequences being drawn from that theory. Meanwhile, according to this view, we perceive that the Jew may be both good and bad, which for him means that he may fulfil the Law or transgress it, and the Gentile may be also good or bad, which for him means that of his own natural intelligence he knows what is morally evil and morally good, and of his own natural endowment can choose and perform either the one or the other. But this is not the view which is most characteristic of or most habitual to the theology of Paul.¹

For the Gentile we have already seen that idolatry and sin are closely allied. We have now to see how the Law is the cause of sin to the Jew, so that both Gentile and Jew are in equal and urgent need of redemption by the work of Christ and by the gift of the Spirit.

Sin to a Jew is the violation of one of God's recognised commands. Such, too, was the sin of Adam. Paul, however, recognises that men could sin, though their sin was not after the likeness of Adam's transgression—that is to say, did not consist in the violation of an acknowledged

¹ It can hardly be argued that Rom. ii. 7-14 are purely theoretic or ironical, and that as a matter of fact no Jew can be conceived of as having shown patience or well-doing, or as just before God, because this would mean that he had fulfilled the *whole* law, which is obviously impossible. This seems too dogmatic an interpretation of this passage, in spite of what Ziegler says (*Geschichte der Ethik*, II., p. 74).

divine command. Sin was in the world between Adam and Moses, although there was no Law. Nevertheless he adds: "Sin is not imputed (ἐλλογᾶται) where there is no law"; and in another connection he says, "Where there is no law, neither is there transgression." What does this mean? No more satisfactory meaning can, as it seems to me, be got out of these verses than the suggestions made by Professor Jowett in his essay on "The Law as the Strength of Sin," and in his notes upon the passages in question. In the first place he points out "that the real difficulty respecting them arises from the state without law being an imaginary one. We readily admit that if anywhere there is no knowledge and no conscience, as in the case of a child, a savage, or a madman, there it is impossible there can be transgression. Of such we should say that they were not to be judged by our standard; that what to our moral notions was an offence was no offence to them; that in their case the laws of civilised countries did not apply. Our difficulty is to conceive the same absence of responsibility in rational beings. The truth is that there is no absence of responsibility, except in that imaginary state of which the Apostle is speaking; a state without knowledge and without law, and, therefore, conceived of as without evil and without crime."¹ But, in the second place, the words of Paul are also partly explicable because, as Professor Jowett shows in his essay, sin to the Apostle is largely identified with the consciousness of sin. It is this consciousness of sin which is produced by the Law.

Before we pass on to this consciousness and to the Law, let us see where we stand. Before the coming of the Law, between Adam and Moses, man, in full accordance with Old Testament teaching, has fallen from the state of innocence and purity in which he was created. By Adam's disobedience the power of sin was evoked, and the flood-gates of iniquity were unbarred; man lapsed into a state of

¹ Paul's Epistles to the Thess., Gal., Rom., 2nd Edit., Vol. II., p. 151.

ignorance of God, and into a moral condition which, however feeble the *consciousness* of sin may have been, was yet one of vice and degradation. The death which followed hard upon the heels of Adam's sin followed upon the doings of all his human posterity. It is not meant that the sin of Adam was imputed to a sinless world. There seems little doubt that Paul's prevailing idea was that the death which ruled over man was, in our ordinary moral sense, deserved by man's own sin. For (and here we touch a new point, which may, however, be introduced in a few words at this place) man's constitution was such that it had no power to refrain from sin. His fleshly nature, his evil disposition, the *יצר הרע* of the Rabbis, was stronger than his natural reason, unstrengthened and unenlightened by the Divine Spirit. But though the necessity of human sin comes perilously near to contradicting what Paul elsewhere says of that patience in well-doing, that search for glory and incorruption, which was possible to both Jew and Gentile even before Christ, and which for them both could issue in the gift of eternal life, still this necessity, as grounded in the fundamental constitution of the natural human soul, would seem to be his prevailing and predominant opinion. It is especially prominent in his theory of the Law.

One might have thought that the needed redemption would have fitly come with Moses; that, as the world had been so long in ignorance of God and in the bondage of idolatry and sin, so to the world at large should come deliverance. But God's ways are "past tracing out." The redemption was put off by the measure of the years which separate Jesus from Moses, and the whole, or at any rate, the main purpose of the revelation to Moses and of the giving of the Law was to make things worse, to increase the quantity, and to accentuate the sharpness of sin. "The Law came in beside that the trespass might abound."

In no other point does the originality of Paul show itself more decisively. Such an absolute *bouleversement* of the Jewish conception of the Law is not to be explained by

any influence of Hellenism. It is purely due to the daring genius of its author. However paradoxical it may appear to us now, however irreconcilable with the text of the Old Testament, which is nevertheless assumed to be true, inspired and divine, however inconsistent with our modern or Jewish conception of a good and just God who does not say one thing and mean another, the doctrine is both interesting in itself and not without its aspects of nobility and of worth.

In addition, however, to this main conception of the Law, namely, that it came in to magnify the bulk and to vivify the consciousness of sin, it also served certain other purposes which seem more congenial to a philosophical student of religious history. For the Law made God known up to a point and to a limited number, and thus paved the way for Christ and his work. It would not have been possible, humanly speaking, for Christ to have been born according to the flesh among any other nation than the Jews, and a certain measure of knowledge was necessary that the first disciples might realise the meaning of Christ's advent. In this sense the Law, as Paul says in the Epistle to the Galatians, has been a "tutor" to bring men unto Christ. Without the Law there could have been no faith which transcends the Law. This seems a point of view parallel to that in which it is said that it is only through metaphysics that we can get beyond metaphysics.

From all points of view alike the Law is purely transitory. One must not, however, suppose that Paul was really filled with a passionate hatred of the Law as such. He only got thoroughly irritated when people tried to introduce the Law among Gentile converts. In the new scheme of things it is obviously out of place, and it was a gross anachronism to bring it in again when and where it had been wholly superseded. It is like incurring voluntary bondage when you have been mercifully emancipated from slavery—the bondage of the Law after the slavery of idolatry and ignorance. It is to run counter

to God's gracious offer of redemption through liberty and faith.

To come back now to the main object of the Law. It was given "that the trespass might abound." How did it make the trespass abound?

First of all it magnified the *desire* to sin. For example, the Law says, "Do not covet." But this very knowledge that to covet is a sin, creates and stimulates the passion of covetousness. Secondly, the Law, by its sheer mass of commandments, increases the *opportunity* of sin. For while there is a natural power to know the good, and though this power or inclination may be identified with the better or true self, still in the natural man this inclination to the good is inherently and *ab initio* weaker than the opposite inclination to succumb to temptation and do the wrong. Now the Law supplies no additional force with which the good but weaker inclination may be strengthened or helped. All it does is to say, "Do this" or "Don't do that"; but it gives no power with which a man may perform or may refrain. It merely creates fresh opportunities in which the evil inclination may triumph, and stimulates desire to a heightened and overwhelming degree. At the best, then (or at the worst), it can but produce that bitter struggle and mournful defeat, that sharp consciousness of sin and that unfulfilled yearning for deliverance, which is so graphically described in the famous seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. The misery and wretchedness of it all are heightened by the fact that, though the Law bestows on man no special power by which to fulfil its enactments, though it even increases the internal force of evil and weakens the internal force of good, it nevertheless thunders curses against all who do not fulfil its decrees. "Cursed be he who continueth not in *all* the words of this Law to do them."

The Law, then, in Paul's own language, begets "the knowledge of sin." It is at this point that we see how closely, as Professor Jowett has shown, sin is "regarded

as the consciousness of sin." His words are so striking that I feel inclined to quote them here in their entirety.

"Sin with us is a definite act or state. Any crime or vice considered in reference to God may be termed sin; or, according to another use of it, which is more general and abstract, sin is the inherent defect of human nature, or that evil state in which, even without particular faults or vices, we live. None of these senses include that peculiar aspect in which it is regarded by St. Paul. Sin is with him inseparable from the consciousness of sin. It is not only the principle of evil, working blindly in the human heart, but the principle of discord and dissolution piercing asunder the soul and spirit. He who has felt its power most is not the perpetrator of the greatest crimes, a Caligula or Nero; but he who has suffered most deeply from the spiritual combat, who has fallen into the abyss of despair, who has the sentence of death in himself, who is wringing his hands and crying aloud in his agony, 'O wretched man that I am!' Sin is not simply evil, but intermediate between evil and good, implying always the presence of God within, light revealing darkness, life in the corruption of death; it is the soul reflecting upon itself in the moment of commission of sin. If we are surprised at St. Paul regarding the law—holy, just, and good as it was—as almost sin, we must remember that sin itself, if the expression may be excused, as a spiritual state, has a good element in it. It is the voice of despair praying to God, 'Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?' It approximates to the law at the very instant in which it is repelled from it." (Vol. II., p. 503.)

Many thoughts, and even difficulties, are raised by Paul's theory. First of all, we notice that it is historically inaccurate. It is doubtful whether anyone before Paul ever felt that the Law was "the strength of sin," or was driven through the Law to spiritual despair. Emphasising certain violent utterances in Deuteronomy, Paul entirely forgot the other side of the shield which was never far distant from

the consciousness of the Jew, the tenderness and compassion of God. Recalling these, he felt no need of an atoning mediator or of a superhuman sacrifice; the agonies of Paul's doubts and difficulties could have been swept away by the mere recitation of the 103rd Psalm. It is true the Law declares that God will by no means clear the guilty, and that he will visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children; but in the same breath it assures us that God is "full of compassion and gracious, slow to anger and plenteous in mercy and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression and sin." Again, Paul too largely assumed that no man could fulfil the Law, whereas in an earlier chapter he had allowed that it was capable of at least a partial and human fulfilment. Jesus did not say "Be ye perfect" in the air: he assumed that a real and considerable measure of goodness was attainable by man. Many before Paul may have felt the conflict between duty and desire, but they will also have felt that God was with them in their struggle to fulfil his Law. It was not a Jewish dogma, though it might be a perversion of one, that man by his unaided strength can fulfil the Law. He needs and he receives the sustainment of God. "Teach us to do thy will." "Plant the love of thy Law in our hearts." "Give us understanding." This was the teaching of contemporary Judaism, a teaching as much ignored by the Apostle as by his modern expounders. The Jew did not believe that God had laid upon him a burden which he could not bear. He could not indeed perfectly fulfil the Law, but he could become a good man, just as he could become a sinner. Paul's theory, if I understand it rightly, seems to me as religiously cruel as it is historically false. What God is that who has given unto man a Law which man must necessarily disobey, who has offered a condition for salvation which must necessarily be unfulfilled? How dreadful to think that not till the coming of Jesus, and then only to those who either chanced or were predestined to believe in his redeeming work, was the Holy Spirit

vouchsafed to man, without which Spirit goodness and peace and salvation were alike beyond his power and beyond his reach. Looked at in this light, how far nobler and truer is the second chapter of the Romans, with its grand concluding verses, so thoroughly prophetic in substance and tone, than the seventh chapter of the same epistle with its false conception of human history and of the human soul. Nevertheless, this being the way in which the consciousness of sin arose in the Apostle's mind, no one can deny that the portrayal of the battle between the higher and the lower self is magnificently fine. For the poignant consciousness of the sinfulness of sin is a necessary element of religious progress. There is about it something noble, bracing and sincere. It is better to think that you cannot fulfil the Law, and to sigh for God's deliverance, than to think you have fulfilled it in its entirety. Not to feel acutely "I might be much better than I am," augurs ill for the religious and moral condition of the soul. Spiritual pride is worse than spiritual despair. For these reasons the words of Paul will always retain their value. So far as the letter of the Law quenches the spirit of the Law, so far as men may be able by fulfilling the letter to think that they have earned salvation by their own deserts, so far the Law, just because it *fails* to cause the consciousness of sin, may yet by way of paradox be called the strength of sin. But this is to anticipate a further count in Paul's indictment.

For hitherto the objection to the Law has been that it produces the knowledge and even the lust of sin on the one hand, with the impotent desire to fulfil it upon the other. But certain, though not very numerous, passages point to an opposite objection. If a man thinks that the Law is capable of fulfilment, and if consequently he believes that through the works of the Law, accomplished by his own effort, he can obtain "justification" in the sight of God, his religious condition is dangerous. Here we draw close to the famous Pauline doctrine of justification by faith. "By the works of the Law shall no man be

justified." Israel attempted to achieve righteousness by works, and failed to achieve righteousness. There is not only a merely forensic element in Paul's doctrine. He did not merely mean that God will only accept and consider righteous the man who believes, and refuse to accept or consider righteous the man who tries to gain righteousness or justification by the works of the Law, but he also meant something more interesting and more ethical. At first it seems an arbitrary assertion on the part of God. It seems as if it had little or nothing to do with morality. It seems as if God said, I will not count any amount of moral effort as worth a straw; I will only hold righteous, or "justify" and therefore "save," those who believe in a certain series of facts. It seems as if "justification" and goodness moved on different planes. There is this legal and arbitrary element in Paul, and we can trace it both in the fourth chapter of the Romans about Abraham, and in the whole argument about the rejection and ultimate salvation of Israel. So far as this element is concerned, it has only historical and biographical interest: it has no religious or moral worth. Indeed it has religious and moral unworth, and has led to and is responsible for the religious and ethical perversions of Calvinism. It has, moreover, at least for Jews, no religious and moral interest; for we are concerned, not with what may happen to us after our death—about which neither Paul or anyone else knew or can know more than we—but how we may become on earth as good as it lies in our power to be. In spite of long obscurity the view of the Hebrew prophets has at last permanently triumphed: "What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly and love mercy and walk humbly with thy God?" Goodness is the only test of justification in the eyes of man and of God. But what is goodness? and "what is walking humbly with thy God?" Here there may be room for the element of moral worth in Paul's dictum that by the works of the Law no man shall be justified. For Paul meant to imply not only that you

cannot attain righteousness by the Law because you can never fulfil the Law, but that, even if you fulfilled the Law, you would not attain righteousness. This amazing paradox shows that we are dealing with an ideal, an ideal of evil. No Jew ever looked at the Law from this point of view. Since the Law was conceived to be the will of God, and since it contained the mandate to love God, to love your neighbour, to bear no malice, and to help the poor, it was certainly believed that justification and salvation could only be acquired by doing what the Law bids us do. And so far the Jew was obviously right. No theory of bargain was ever conceived. It was never deliberately supposed that man could claim salvation by his own desert. The Jewish doctrine of justification by works went scarcely further than Paul himself in the second chapter of the Romans. It is the merest common sense to suppose that if there be such places or states as heaven and hell, or if there be rewards and punishments after death, God will make a difference between the sinner and the saint, the martyr and the scoundrel, the transgressor and the man who has honestly sought to fulfil the Law. Nobody who is even superficially familiar with the prevailing tone of the Rabbinical literature and of the Jewish liturgy, can avoid a smile at the fixed and mechanical theories about justification by works which Paul's Jewish contemporaries are seriously supposed to have held.

Nevertheless the Law was capable, as every other good thing is capable, of moral perversion. Such a perversion, idealised and sublimated, is assumed by Paul. Suppose a man tries to fulfil outwardly all the ordinances of the Law whether ceremonial or moral. If he is a rich man he can help the poor, he can pay his tithes, he can observe the Sabbath, and so on, without any sacrifice or difficulty. His heart may be filled with pride. He can really believe that he is driving a bargain with God. He can be self-deluded and self-deceived. He may be a complete spiritual hypocrite, without any real consciousness of the fact. Such

a person does not really love either God or man; he may, however, think that he does so, because he gives such large sacrifices to God, and makes such handsome donations to the poor. And at any rate there will be many commandments, which, in their letter, at all events, he will fulfil to a nicety. Such a person—a sheer caricature of Jewish piety, as unlike the typical Rabbi as chalk is to cheese, but nevertheless an ideal of irreligion, towards which doubtless some hypocrites under the Law may have more or less closely approached—would be the man whose attempted “justification by works” Paul ridicules and opposes. (What Paul does not see is that you can have a real as well as a false justification by works, just as you can have a false as well as a real justification by faith.)

So far as I can understand, the true element of moral worth in Paul’s objection to a “justification by works” is that it may cause self-righteousness and self-delusion; it may produce that ludicrous condition of mind which demands recognition from God as a debt, and not as grace, which claims salvation as the reward of merit, and does not seek for it as the gift of love. Reward, desert, merit, boasting, glorification, pride—these are the ideas against which Paul rightly protests in the relation of the individual man with his God. Although from one point of view we may truly say that there seems no possibility of divine justice, unless a man who has led a life of undeserved misery on earth should receive “compensation” in another world; as regards ourselves, no man’s religious and moral condition is healthy or high who thinks that he should justly “go to heaven” upon the basis of his own deserts. And since, if you think that, you have a perverted conception of your relation to God, as well as a false notion of goodness, the more you seek to get to heaven upon these conditions, the further you will be from it, and the deeper you will sink into the mire of irreligion. In that sense, and for such a man, the doctrine of justification by works is indeed a stone of stumbling

and a rock of offence. The nearer you think yourself to the goal, the further you are from it. The better you suppose yourself to be, the worse you really are. "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned as of grace, but of debt." But for such a one there is no reward. The supposed creditor refuses to acknowledge the debt. Not till you confess and believe that nothing is owing, will the reward be given you, not of debt, but of grace.

Besides these two fundamental objections to the Law, there are also traces of others. Paul usually makes no distinction whatever between the moral and ceremonial ordinances. The Law to him is a whole, in one sense good and divine; in another, the cause of sin and a curse. Occasionally, however, the distinction, re-enunciated by Jesus on the basis of the older prophets, is alluded to by Paul. In the Epistle to the Galatians this point of view comes out most strongly. The Law in its ceremonial aspects is there positively co-ordinated with the rites and the ritual of heathendom, so that the coquetting of the Galatians with the Law after their conversion to Christ is regarded as a return to their old condition of Pagan bondage. They seek to "observe days and months and seasons and years"; they turn back to "the weak and beggarly rudiments," desiring once again "to be in bondage." It is partly this strong language, which finds no full parallel in the Epistle to the Romans, upon which Clemen bases his hypothesis of the priority of that Epistle to the Galatians. In Romans, however, we get the great aphorism about food, "I know and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus that nothing is unclean of itself, save that to him who accounteth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean," followed by and founded on the majestic saying, "The kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit." Upon this I need not enlarge, as its value and truth are self-evident to all.

Finally, we get the idea that the Law is a bondage.

By this, apparently, Paul means two things. First, the Law is a bondage by reason of its ceremonial entanglements. It makes people bother themselves about meat and drink, frightens them with scruples about clean and unclean, worries them about the correct observance of "days and months and seasons and years," and in general, imposes on them a yoke of petty and valueless and unspiritual details. Secondly, he means the old objection—that the Law merely orders you from without, but gives you no power of fulfilling, or, as it were, accepting it from within. You can have Christ or the Spirit within you; you cannot have the Law within you. That must remain an external task-master whose orders you are never competent to carry out. Such is the meaning of the famous phrase, "The letter killeth; the Spirit giveth life," and "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." The liberty meant is liberty from the Law and its bondage; "the letter killeth" signifies that the Law which threatens death for the non-fulfilment of ordinances which man is powerless to fulfil, is task-master and executioner in one. Schmiedel is doubtless perfectly right when he says that "die geläufige und an sich sehr werthvolle Anwendung, dass Haften am Buchstaben einer Satzung das geistige Leben ersticke," was not directly intended, or even indirectly implied.¹

We have now passed through the main points in Paul's attack upon the Law. We have seen that while given apparently for eternity, its real purpose was only temporary. Its seeming object was to make men better, and to qualify them for the kingdom of God; its true object was to create the knowledge and the lust of sin. At its best, its intended result was to stimulate a desire for redemption through the medium of a spiritual despair; at its worst it led almost inevitably to self-delusion, hypocrisy and

¹ *Hand-Commentar zum Neuen Testament* (Freiburg, 1891), Vol. II., p. 189.

pride. It claims fulfilment, but no man can fulfil it; it demands obedience, but none can obey. It threatens the transgressor with a curse, but it was only given that transgression might abound; it promises the doer of it reward, but the reward is beyond man's power to attain. It assumes that its commands may be obeyed, but the assumption of obedience is more fatal than the consciousness of transgression. Its only end is death: death for him who tries and knows that he has failed, death to him who tries and thinks that he has accomplished. It seems to say, "Through me you can become good," but what it seems to say is cruel delusion and captivating snare; for if, at the best, it does not produce the consciousness of sin on the one hand, it can only produce boastfulness and irreligion upon the other. Truly an awful gift from God; a marvellous issue of evil from that which in itself was "holy and righteous and good." Surely the disproportion of effect to cause is itself enough to prove the error of the argument.¹

Such, nevertheless, is the Law, and in this servitude were men held captive from the age of Moses to the age of Christ. Then at the appointed season, God redeems man from his bondage to the Law and to sin, and gives him righteousness and salvation through Christ's work for man, and through man's faith in Christ.

I do not propose to analyse here Paul's conception of the nature of Christ. The exact metaphysical position which is assigned to Christ by Paul has for a Jew only historical interest. It has for him no religious and spiritual value. While any one who has no belief in the Deity of Christ may find certain elements of moral and religious value in Paul's doctrine of sin and of the Law, I do not see how far the niceties of his conception of Christ,

¹ When the purpose and effect of the Law are considered, Paul's words, "What advantage then hath the Jew? Much every way," seem little better than irony.

or the precise measure of the difference which separates that conception from the apostles of Jerusalem on the one hand, and from the author of Ephesians and the fourth Gospel on the other, can be to him of any real interest except from the point of view of historical theology. Any theory of Christ's nature, which makes him more than man, is out of relation, not only to the belief of the modern Jew, but also to his religious and spiritual life. And it is only those elements of Paul's teaching which have, or might have, this relation that are of the deepest interest to the present writer.

From the evidence of those particular epistles which, on the authority of Pfleiderer and Weizsäcker, have here been assumed to be the only genuine epistles of Paul, it would seem as if Christ occupied a place midway between man and God. He is more than man ; he is less than God. He is the link between the two ; as the head of every man is Christ, so the head of Christ is God. He may be described as "the second Adam," the heavenly man ; he is also the image of God, upon whose face the glory of God shines continually. He was created by God, but his creation recedes into the mists of eternity ; in his pre-existence before the incarnation Paul certainly believed. What his work before that incarnation may have been is not exactly determinable. Two rather isolated and obscure sentences in the first Epistle to the Corinthians can be referred to this period. But the full acknowledgment of Christ's place or office as Son of God seems in Paul's mind to date from the resurrection (cf. Rom. i. 4). After that resurrection, and separated from it, as Paul believed, by no large interval of time, would be "the end, when Christ shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father," when he shall have subdued and abolished all authority and every enemy, including death itself. Then, "when all things shall have been subjected unto him," the Son himself "shall be subjected to him that did subject all things unto him, that God may be all in all." What the place and office of Christ would

be after this grand consummation, Paul leaves undetermined.

Nor is this reticence unnatural. Christ's main business concerned man. Paul's universe did not comprise anybody else who needed the redeeming sacrifice of Christ. Angels and demons could claim no help from him, and they, together with man, exhausted the rational world.¹ It seems as if no Christology could have arisen if there had not been a time when earth and man were regarded as the centre of the universe.

What, then, is the nature of Christ's work for man? First and foremost, it is not the work which Christ himself essayed to do in the narratives of the Synoptics. It is not the work of a great teacher. For Paul the significance of Christ's work lies almost exclusively in his crucifixion and resurrection. His work is essentially miraculous and supernatural. It is conditioned by his nature. Being what he was, he was able to do what he did; but what he did was, as it were, all arranged beforehand. It was divinely planned and divinely controlled, and a supernatural and miraculous efficacy was super-imposed upon the two great stages of the process. Nevertheless, the work of Christ was also ethical—ethical not only in the creation of human faith with all its issues, but also because it was, in itself, an exhibition of goodness and of love. It was the proof of God's love to man in thus arranging for and allowing man's redemption. It was an exhibition of Christ's love for man, and of his incomparable and yet imitable character, in that from the fulness of his heavenly bliss he accepted his human mission, lived a sinless life on earth, and voluntarily underwent the penalty and the sacrifice of death. To the mind of Paul the history of Christ irrefragably demonstrated the beneficence of God, while it also provided for man the pattern and standard

¹ In Colossians i. 20, the redemptive work of Christ is extended to "things in the heavens" as well as to "things upon the earth." Cp. Pfeiderer, *Das Urchristenthum*, p. 676.

according to which he ought to live. And by the grace of God, the power was now given him to follow in the footsteps of the ideal.

To the demands of the Law man had sought to conform, but failure was constant and inevitable; but now, for an ideal far higher and nobler than the ideal of the Law—an ideal which he could inwardly assimilate as well as outwardly acknowledge, a living ideal of love, no longer a written ideal of bondage—for this ideal, power was supernaturally given him to follow it, and to obey. He could imitate Christ, because, if he believed in Christ, Christ's spirit would become his spirit, and his life a reproduction of the life of Christ. Though man be man, and Christ be Christ, and the difference between them be vast; yet Paul offers to the believer the possibility of being able to say with him, "I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I that live; but Christ liveth in me, and that life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith, the faith which is in the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself up for me."¹

What, then, was this miraculous and yet ethical work of Christ which could lead to such miraculous and yet ethical transformations in the nature and in the life of man?

In the first place, Christ freed men from the curse of the Law, and abolished it. He was the end of the Law. It might be said that the heathen are free from or without the Law. Did Christ, then, as regards the Jews, merely put them into the same category as the Gentiles? Clearly not. The truth is rather that he raised both Gentile and Jew, the one from a state of lawless licence, the other from

¹ "Could anyone say now, 'The life not that I live, but that Christ liveth in me'? Such language with St. Paul is no mere phraseology, such as is repeated from habit in prayers; but the original consciousness of the Apostle respecting his own state. Self is banished from him, and has no more place in him, as he goes on his way to fulfil the work of Christ. No figure is too strong to express his humiliation in himself, or his exaltation in Christ." Jowett, vol. I., p. 361. (From the magnificent essay, *On the Character of St. Paul.*)

a state of legal sinfulness, into a common higher plane of being from which the ethical portion of the Law could be fulfilled. In other words, Christ destroyed sin, and won for man eternal life. Through him and his work that external power of sin—*die objective Macht der Sünde*, as the Germans call it—was abolished, and the death which followed hard upon the heels of sin was in principle abolished too. The theory of Paul cannot properly be explained unless we try to remember that he seems to have supposed that sin is something over and above the particular sins in which it is manifested. It was for him almost a person—a force, at all events, with something of an independent life. It was this force, which man by his own strength was powerless to overcome, that Christ subdued and demolished. And together with this negative and destructive work, the death and resurrection of Christ betokened a positive and creative work as well. Man was now granted a means, which, if he will but use it, enables him, whether Jew or Gentile, to be good and to acquire righteousness. This righteousness is given of God, but is also possessed by man. Through it salvation and eternal life are within his reach. The interpenetration, as we may say, of the Spirit of God with the nature of man, through the agency of Christ, is a marked feature of Paul's system. In one sense God freely gives this new righteousness; man is conscious that it is not his, but God's. In another sense man himself wins this righteousness by the voluntary effort and exercise of faith. The proof of the gift of God's Spirit is man's faith, and yet it is also true to say that faith is the condition of the gift. "No man can say Jesus is Lord, except in the Holy Spirit"; and, on the other hand, "if thou believe that God raised Jesus from the dead, thou shalt be saved," that is, thou shalt receive the Spirit. Through faith to the Spirit, or through the Spirit to faith. These are but different ways of looking at a two-sided process, which is simultaneous and only separable in thought.

Now these results were effected by the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. Scholars still debate on the method of these supernatural processes. So much, however, is clear: God could not pardon man without the redeeming death of Christ. In spite of Weber's book, which is now generally regarded as final and authoritative in both method and statement, the Jewish liturgy and the Midrashic literature make me shrewdly suspect that on the question of sin and forgiveness, the theology of the Rabbis extended little beyond that of the 103rd psalm, though united, with unobserved and sometimes painful inconsistency, to the far less spiritual teaching of the annual Day of Atonement. No man was sinless: but it was God's *métier* to forgive sins. In this simple way and with this simple belief, you could live a life of peace and communion with God in spite of earthly failings and occasional wrongdoing, and after death you could secure your share of life eternal. But Paul seemed to think that not only were sin and the miserable consciousness of sin and alienation from God inevitable and necessary, once the awful chain had been started by Adam, but that death (*ἀπώλεια*) and the wrath of God were necessary and inevitable too. Man could not get reconciled to God: God could not reconcile himself to man. Constant sin, issuing (as due punishment and consequence) in constant death; abiding enmity and abiding alienation;—such was the condition of man and such his relation to God till Christ died and rose and broke the spell. Why did the crucifixion and resurrection do all this? Was Christ's death a sacrifice? And if so, in what sense? Why did the abolition of the Law need Christ's death, and in what way did this death abolish the Law? Let me put together a few of the crucial passages without attempting to comment upon them in detail.

1. Christ "gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us out of this present evil age, according to the will of our God and Father" (Gal. i. 4).

2. Christ redeemed us (*i.e.*, bought us off) from the curse of

the Law, in that he became a curse for us : for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree (*Ib.* iii. 13).

3. God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not reckoning unto them their trespasses. Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf, that we might become the righteousness of God in him (2 Cor. v. 19-21).

4. All have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God, being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in the Messiah Jesus : whom God set forth to be a propitiation, (*ἱλαστήριον*), through faith, in his blood, to show his righteousness, because of the passing over of the sins done aforetime, in the forbearance of God ; for the showing of righteousness at this present season : that he might himself be just and the justifier of him that hath faith in Jesus (Rom. iii. 23-26).

5. While we were yet weak, in due season Christ died for the ungodly. God establishes his own love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more, then, being now justified by his blood, shall we be saved from the wrath of God through him. For if, while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by his life (*Ib.* v. 6-10).

6. Are ye ignorant that all we who were baptised into Christ Jesus were baptised into his death ? We were buried therefore with him through baptism into death : that, like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life. For if we have become united with the likeness of his death, we shall also be united with the likeness of his resurrection : knowing this, that our old man was crucified with him, that the body of sin might be done away, that so we should no longer be in bondage to sin ; for he that hath died is justified from sin. But if we died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him ; knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more ;

death no more hath dominion over him. For the death that he died, he died unto sin once for all; but the life that he liveth he liveth unto God. Even so reckon ye also yourselves to be dead unto sin, but alive unto God in Christ Jesus (*Ib.* vi. 3-11).

7. There is therefore now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus. For the Law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus made me free from the Law of sin and of death. For what the Law could not do, wherein it was weak through the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh: so that the requirement of the Law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit (*Ib.* viii. 1-4).

What Paul means, in the fourth of these passages, by the forbearance of God, I do not clearly apprehend. What did he suppose was the fate after death of everybody who had died before the advent of Christ? Was their death a real *ἀπώλεια*? Or should it have been so according to strict justice, but was the death of Christ accepted retrospectively on their behalf, and would they, at the final resurrection, have a share in "eternal life"? This does not seem indicated elsewhere. Or does the "forbearance" merely allude to Paul's sinful contemporaries? From the fifth passage it is clear that before Christ, man and God are conceived as normally in a condition of enmity to each other. It is this enmity to which Christ put an end. Christ, as we know, is man's head or representative; he is the type or *Inbegriff* of humanity, and yet is sinless. Hence, his death, which cannot be a punishment for his own sin, is accepted as a sacrifice for the sins of all men. It is, however, so accepted only for those who believe in Christ and in his sacrifice. The Law is satisfied and is also abolished: its object was to create trespass: these trespasses Christ has now atoned for. Therefore the business of the Law is over. Christ literally satisfied the curse of the Law by becoming a curse according to its own enactments. It scarcely seems safe to

put more into the first passage than this. Dr. Drummond says, "The curse of the Law, valid till then, lost its power by touching one to whom it could have no just application. By the Law he was cursed ; by the very nature of righteousness and of God he was blessed ; and, therefore, the Law was dead."¹ Everett's book is perhaps little more than an enlargement on this text of Drummond's.² In the fourth passage Christ is called a "propitiation," which undoubtedly seems to have a sacrificial signification. Just as God chose by the sacrifice of an animal to forgive the sin of the man on whose behalf it was sacrificed, so he chooses by the death of Christ to ignore and forgive the sins of those who have faith in Christ. And by the seventh passage we see that not only was the purpose of Christ's death to forgive separate sins, but also to break down the domination of sin in the future. God sent his Son "for" man, but he also sent him "for" sin, to save the one and to destroy the other.

It strikes one forcibly that Paul's theory of Christ was especially framed for the first believers—for men, in other words, who had already lived for some while as sinful Jews or as sinful Gentiles respectively, and in the midst of their varied lives had accepted the new revelation. For we have seen that the work of Christ is not clearly applicable to those who had died before his advent. The profit of it is also not to be secured by those who do not believe in it. It is no mere mechanical process or arbitrary convention. There is an external element about it, it is true, but it must also be inwardly appropriated through faith. Its effect upon those who thus accepted it was, or should be, to transform their moral nature. They were to walk after the Spirit, for the Spirit is in them, and not after the flesh ; the power of sin was broken. Therefore the *propitiatory* work of Christ was clearly intended to apply to the past life of those who have hitherto lived as lawless

¹ *Epistle to the Galatians*, ed. Dr. James Drummond. 1893.

² Charles C. Everett, *Gospel of Paul*. Boston, 1893.

Gentiles or as law-breaking Jews. Paul, who believed that the end of the age (*αἰών*) was so near at hand, and the final page of the world's history so imminent, did not contemplate endless generations of nominal Christians—nominal believers. What relation the death of Christ would have to the endless sins which these believers—who, alas! still remained weak and sinful—should commit, it is impossible to say; for the true believer should also be a good man. The contrast between a nominal Christian and a real Christian, which forced itself too sharply upon Paul's attention to be ignored, seems to have puzzled as well as pained him. Surely such a contrast could be but transient.

It would be most interesting if we could learn something of Paul's views on morality, and of his own moral character before his conversion. As a full-blown Christian, his whole nature—all, at least, that was best in him and holiest—seemed to depend upon his faith in Christ. In his own judgment, through "being in Christ" or having Christ in him, he had become a "new creature." And this is what every true believer, who received his baptism in faith, should also become—in one sense, indeed, it would be true to say, *does* become. For even as we have already seen that the death of Christ had an objective side in itself, annulling the dominion of sin and reconciling God to man and man to God, so for the individual the very process of baptism has also an objective side, or, as it were, re-enacts and confirms for each particular person what Christ had done generally for the race. According to Lipsius,¹ this is the meaning of the opening verses of the sixth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, which have already been quoted. The believer is baptised "into the death of Christ," and therefore, even as Christ died "unto sin once for all," so, in virtue of this partnership, has the believer himself "died unto sin" as well. There is no need why he should ever sin any longer; sin is no longer his master.

¹ In *Hand-Commentar zum Neuen Testament*, *ad loc.*

He can be good, therefore he ought. "We who died to sin, how shall we any longer live therein?" The paradox of the question clearly indicates how closely in Paul's mind the "ought" and the "can" were connected. A sinner and a Christian is almost a contradiction in terms. If a man really believed, he could not sin. For if he has faith he has the Spirit, and the Spirit enfranchises from sin. The man who really knew the right could not choose to do wrong, said Socrates; the man who really believed in Christ could not desire to sin, said Paul.¹

Faith begins with intellectual acceptance, or rather, perhaps, it begins with unfailing and absolute confidence in God and in the Son of God, but it passes over into a kind of ethical devotion. Although faith implies the possession of the Spirit, although the new life is not your own, but Christ in you, still Paul's continual tone of entreaty, and even his frequent words of counsel and command, show that he also believed that the highest faith and the highest life—which may both be described as "faith working through love"—is not attainable except by effort and sacrifice.² Ezekiel had said long ago, in unharmonised juxtaposition, "God will give you a new spirit," and also, "Get you a new spirit"; so likewise does Paul say, with more conscious, because to him only apparent, contradiction, "It is God who worketh in you to will and to work," and also, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling"; or, again, in one breath, "Sin shall not have dominion over you," and in another, "Let not sin reign" over you.³

¹ Mit Christus gestorben sein und noch in der Sünde leben; mit Christus auferstanden sein und nicht in der Neuheit des Lebens wandeln, wäre eine Absurdität (Immer, *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, p. 306).

² Ohne die Gottesgabe des πνεῦμα können die Gläubigen freilich nicht κατὰ πνεῦμα περιπατεῖν, aber ist es ihnen einmal gegeben, so ist es ihnen nicht so gegeben, dass es nur mit zwingender Nothwendigkeit wirke, und dass sie ganz passiv dem πνεῦμα sich hinzugeben hätten (*Ibid.* p. 307.)

³ In Romans xiii. 14, Paul "exhorts believers to 'put on Christ'"; in

The ethical effect which should ensue upon the belief that Christ died for our sake and died to sin, and that we, through faith and baptism, are potentially dead to sin likewise, partners in his death and partners in his resurrection, is apparently threefold. In the first place it produces a constancy in sorrow—nay, a positive delight in suffering and in the heroic endurance of misfortune and pain. Fellowship with the sufferings of Christ is a visible sign that we have received Christ; and, as we are so far likened to him by suffering on earth, so shall we be also likened to him in a spiritual and blissful resurrection. If suffering is unable to quench our faith, the power of Christ is the more triumphantly displayed through and in spite of the misery of his disciple. "Wherefore I take pleasure in weaknesses and injuries, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ's sake. For when I am weak, then am I strong." The ethical power of this belief can scarcely be over-rated. Before his conversion Paul may have interpreted suffering, like the wise men before him, as educational; but this conception of it does not fully suffice. It is not always applicable, and does not seem always just. Now, however, by his faith in Christ, suffering for the apostle was ennobled and transfigured. It became a privilege on the one hand, a means to a great end upon the other. The due endurance of it would not only serve the individual sufferer for highest profit, but it also served the cause of Christ and proclaimed his truth. The transfiguration of suffering, though sometimes exaggerated, is surely one of the great spiritual benefits which Christianity, as such, has conferred upon the world. Moreover, Paul was following closely in the footsteps of his Master (Matt. v. 11, 12).¹

Gal. iii. 27 "he implies that they have already obtained in baptism the state which is thus described. In one sense the believer is regenerate; in another, not. His whole life is anticipated in the beginning, and still he may be exhorted to begin" (Jowett on Gal. iii. 27. Cf. note on 1 Thess. v. 7).

¹ The patient endurance and even welcoming of suffering are enjoined

But, secondly, a true faith in Christ implies a constant and watchful zealousness to walk by that Spirit of Christ and God through whose agency faith and goodness were alike possible. Potentially, as we have seen, by the very rite of baptism and the confession of faith in Christ, our "old man" was crucified with Christ, but this spiritual crucifixion, *de jure*, ought to be transformed, since it *can* be transformed, by personal effort and personal zeal, into a spiritual crucifixion *de facto*. Man must die to his lower self, or, in Pauline phraseology, he must die to the world. His belief in Christ's death must lead to an ethical reproduction of it in his own life. The Spirit, as it were, is to his hand; no obstacle prevents the use of it; the store of latent goodness must be converted into active reality. For they that are "of Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with the passions and the lusts thereof."

Thirdly, a full faith in Christ implies not merely a sacrifice of flesh to Spirit, or of lower self to higher, but also the abnegation of all selfishness, egoism and pride. "Christ died for all." Since he is man's head and representative, this means that all men died with him. They not only died to the Law and to its obligations, but they died in a sense to themselves. Everything separate, individual, egoistic about them, everything of which they could boast as their own possession and accomplishment, was destroyed by the death of Christ. The crucifixion and resurrection produced a great human equality; it broke down the wall of separation between Jew and Gentile, as in a religious respect it broke down and made indifferent the distinction between bond and free, female and male. Before Christ none can boast of his wisdom or his powers or his goodness, for none may live "unto himself," but all must live "unto Christ." This, following Schmiedel and bearing in

on cognate grounds in later epistles, cf., the noble passage, 1 Pet. ii. 19-21, where the suffering Christ is the example, and Barnabas vii. fin. (οἱ θέλοντές με ἰδεῖν καὶ ἄψασθαί μου τῆς βασιλείας ὑφείλουσιν θλιβέντες καὶ παθόντες λαβεῖν με).

mind the context, seems to be the meaning of the famous passage in 2 Corinthians: "one died for all," therefore all died; and he "died for all, that they which live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again." Absolute devotion and absolute surrender to Christ—which, of course, includes and implies the service and practice of goodness;—this to Paul is the logical and necessary result of a Christian's faith. In the Christian community, which forms the body of Christ, "none of us liveth to himself, and none dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; or whether we die, we die unto the Lord; whether we live, therefore, or die, we are the Lord's."

This devotion to Christ is not based upon his life on earth. Though in an abstract sort of way Paul bids us emulate and imitate the sufferings of Christ, what really appeals to him is always the crucified and risen Christ, not "Christ after the flesh." The love of Christ to man is never proved and illustrated by the incidents of his human life; it rests upon his incarnation and his death. When he is exhorting the Corinthians to show liberality, or the Philippians to be humble, he uses Christ as an exemplar; but he bids them imitate not the life of Christ on earth, but the fact that the pre-existent Christ in heaven abandoned his greatness of place to accept the fashion and likeness of man and to humble himself even unto death (Phil. ii. 6—8; 2 Cor. viii. 9).

Moreover, it is highly important to notice that the love of Christ for man, which raises Paul's spiritual enthusiasm to so lofty a pitch, is closely identified with the love of God. Christ's love is the proof of God's love; the second is evidenced by the first. For the mission and death and resurrection of Christ were pre-ordained and pre-arranged by God. It is God who made the sinless one to be sin on our behalf; it is God who set him forth to be a propitiation through faith; it is God's love which Christ's death establishes and "commends." Consequently, with Paul at

any rate, the dangerous process had scarcely begun which was to lead to a sort of worship of Christ the Son over against, and even superior to, the worship of God the Father. To Paul, God did not seem just and stern; Christ, merciful and loving. In that wonderful semi-lyric passage which concludes the eighth chapter of the Romans, the love of Christ for man, from which no anguish can separate, but which, on the contrary, is proved and testified by suffering—this love may be equally well described as the “love of God which is in Jesus Christ our Lord.” God’s love for man is revealed in the mission and in the office of Christ.¹

We have seen that the believer, through his baptism into Christ, died, and was buried with Christ, and that the object of this transferred or imputed death was that as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so might “we also walk in newness of life.” Here the resurrection and heavenly life of Christ are regarded as the condition and the type of the ethical transformation which God’s grace and man’s faith have jointly rendered possible. Because Christ not only died but rose again, therefore our own death to sin is but the prelude to another life which shall be lived with him. And as the life of the risen Christ is spiritual, so will, can, and ought our new life to be spiritual too. In one sense, therefore, the believer already enjoys or can enjoy the fruit of Christ’s resurrection. He already shares or can share in the spiritual life of Christ; he lives or can live with the risen Christ. But, nevertheless, this newness of life is not perfect. It will not be perfected until the believer is clothed, even as Christ at his resurrection was clothed, with a spiritual “body” over which death has no dominion, and which is untainted by the weakness of

¹ As against this it should be noted that in the same passage Paul also speaks of the risen Christ “making intercession” for us (*ἰντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*). Cf. also the “intercession” of the Spirit in verses 26 and 27.

flesh. This body will answer to the spirit which animates it; the crucified lower self will no longer exist. The harmony of soul and body will be complete; the possibility of conflict will be for ever at an end. The one resurrection leads on to the other; the less perfect to the more perfect. Faith and baptism and the gift of the Spirit bring about the first resurrection—that newness of life, that living with Christ, which have already been described; and then these very gifts and graces will lead on to the second resurrection which is outward as well as inward, visible as well as spiritual. Because Christ is already in you—that is, in the believer—your body is dead, “dead because of sin”; but your spirit—the new spirit which is the gift of God and the likeness of Christ—that spirit is essentially life, “life because of righteousness.”¹ Still the body, though, in one sense, “dead,” is in another sense existent, and so, to perfect the entire scheme and process, “since the spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you already, he that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies for the sake of his Spirit that dwelleth in you.” God must give this Spirit of his an outward embodiment worthy of its quality. That the dead will be raised, and that those believers who are alive when the trump of God shall sound, will undergo a bodily transformation, Christ’s own resurrection proves. “If the dead are not raised, neither has Christ been raised.” But if Christ was not raised, the whole religion of faith tumbles to the ground. There has been no forgiveness of sins, for there can be no newness of life. “If Christ has not been raised, your faith is idle; ye are yet in your sins.” Moreover, Paul, like Christ himself for that matter, did not consider suffering and anguish as ends in themselves or as ideal conditions for the perfected man. To him, to Jesus, and to the

¹ Rom. viii. 10. For the meaning of the words in inverted commas see Lipsius, *ad loc.*

ordinary Jew, there would be unclouded happiness in heaven or in the life of resurrection. Therefore he says, "If we had merely hoped in Christ in this life, we are of all men most pitiable" (because their lives had not only been lived for a delusion, but were in themselves miserable and hard); and again, "If the dead are not raised, let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

It is unnecessary to set forth in detail the (not always consistent) eschatology of Paul. That the second "coming" of Christ was near the Apostle seems fully to have believed, though, as the text-books point out, in his later epistles he anticipated the possibility of his own death before the advent of the judgment day. He speaks of "departing and being with Christ." This expression, and the parallel one in the Corinthians, "to be at home with the Lord," raise another difficulty. For in them it would seem as if Paul, like a modern Christian or Jew, hoped for a condition of conscious beatitude immediately after death, whereas his more general view would be that the dead will sleep in dreamy unconsciousness until the day of judgment. We are, however, met by still graver difficulties in what Paul has written about that judgment itself. Logically, from what we may gather out of the Epistle to the Romans, that day and the resurrection which precedes it should take place, when all the races of the Gentiles have received the Gospel, and when the Jews, whose heart has been hardened (though the doom is also a punishment), in order that the Gentiles should be saved, have also realised and accepted the faith of Christ. No such logical time is fixed for its advent in the 1st Thessalonians, for it is there said to be sudden, unexpected, and unforetrollable. But who are to be judged at the judgment? As Pfeiderer points out, the resurrection, on the Pauline view of it, should be exclusively reserved for the believers in Christ.¹ It is they alone who can receive that spiritual body which is the outward form

¹ *Das Urchristenthum*, p. 296.

in which the dead will rise. The unbelievers must remain in hell or in the endless sleep of death. On the other hand, in the second chapter of the Romans we find Paul alluding to a blissful and a miserable life after death as the possible lot of both Jew and Gentile. Again, why should there be, and how can there be, a judgment on the believer? If the Christian's faith in Christ has been true and real enough to deserve a spiritual body, how can he merit punishment? Is not this spiritual body in itself a sign of grace? And is not a judgment which metes out reward and punishment according to works in flagrant contradiction to Paul's own principle of justification and salvation by faith? Are such passages as Romans xiv. 10-12; Gal. vi. 7, 8; 2 Cor. v. 10; ix. 6, consistent with the theory that the reward is not reckoned as of debt but of grace? The truth seems to be that Paul was forced by common sense and the evidence of his senses to realize that every kind of sin was still possible for those who nominally, at least, professed and acknowledged the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. In one sense these men did really believe in Christ; they were *ἄγιοι*, saints: from this point of view Paul, who had the same partiality for a believer in Christ as an ordinary Jew had for a descendant of Abraham according to the flesh, considered that every Christian belonged to the elect, and would have a share in the resurrection of the dead. As contradistinguished from the unbeliever, whether Jew or Gentile, all Christians assume this position of vantage, just as to the eyes of a Jew, all Jews assume it as contradistinguished from the heathen. But when his eyes were fixed upon the actual state of the Christian communities, as when the ordinary Jew's eye was fixed upon the actual state of the Jewish people, a healthy religious common sense came into play both with the ordinary Jew and with Paul. Then he was not so purblind as not to see that there were differences between Christian and Christian, and that these differences, though you might theoretically describe them as differences

of true faith, must be, for practical purposes, described as that which indeed they were—differences of works, differences of moral character and ethical worth. There were good Christians and bad Christians, and the bad could not receive from a just God the same treatment as the good. "The unrighteous," says Paul, with true Jewish simplicity, "shall not inherit the kingdom of God." Whether Paul definitely believed that all Christians alike would rise at the judgment day, and that the bad Christians would then be punished, some for ever and some for a temporary and educational period only, cannot be dogmatically stated. He wrote about these things as occasion arose. He did not deliberately sit down to compose a consistent and connected treatise on eschatology. And as he wrote, one aspect of the future, or one aspect of the truth, fully possessed him, to the temporary exclusion of other aspects, on which, at other times and for other needs, he is equally and ardently absorbed.

It is more profitable (as well as more interesting) to turn aside from Paul's fragmentary and inconsistent doctrines of the "last things" to the details, so far as we can elicit them from the six epistles, of his ethical teaching.¹

Paul's ethics are mainly incidental. But even so they are fairly comprehensive. He has a firm grasp on the essentials of duty. His moral exhortations at the close of the Thessalonians, the Galatians and the Romans cover a great deal of ground. They fasten on the abiding elements of noble character, the fundamental features of ethical religion. The list of the virtues hardly exceed the limits of Old Testament and Rabbinical morality: they have, however, a spirit and a sureness of touch, a vigour and a connectedness essentially their own. They are deducible from certain principles, so that they become something

¹ A "first impression." I do not think I should quite write so again after reading the important book of Kabisch, *Die Eschatologie des Paulus*. Paul's eschatology was a more fundamental, far-reaching, and pervasive element in his teaching than I had imagined.

more than isolated and heterogeneous maxims. They may fairly be said to flow from the one central principle of Love, that "more excellent way" and "abiding" grace, the virtues and fruits of which are so superbly set forth in the thirteenth chapter of the 1st Corinthians. Even before he wrote that famous chapter, Paul had subtly connected his sovereign ethical principle of love with his sovereign religious principle of faith, when he had said that in the religion of Christ "neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but only faith working through and expressed in love," *πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη*.

The believer, according to Paul, is a changed creature. He glories only in the cross of Christ, through which the world is crucified unto him and he unto the world.¹ The lower, egoistic self, with its wearing strife and its vain desires, the flesh, with the passions and the lusts thereof, are now subdued and abolished. Hence the primal virtue of the Christian is what we now call unselfishness. He does not seek his own advantages, *οὐ ζητεῖ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ*, a virtue which is also described as the characteristic of love. Negatively, this unselfishness shows itself in an avoidance of all pride, vainglory, jealousy, strife, envy, insolence, boastfulness—sins against which Paul continually protests. It shows itself actively in a perfect humility, in honouring others, in modesty, in meekness; *πραΰτης* is a virtue of man as it was a virtue of Christ. Again, unselfishness should lead to unity and harmony in Christian congregations. Each man must do his own part and fulfil his own vocation. Factions, party spirit, contentiousness, disputations and rivalries are to be avoided. So we pass to the more active aspects of unselfishness, living for others, which is the law of Christ and the imitation of Christ. Negatively, the sins which are rebuked by Paul under this head comprise covetousness and extortion, revilings, back-

¹ I omit here all reference to Paul's "concrete ethics," that is, to his views of women, the family, slavery, and the State.

bitings and whisperings, malignity and deceit. (His wealth of ethical language strikes me as considerable.) Positively, we get the virtues of kindness and longsuffering, brotherly affection, active helpfulness and sympathy. "Render to no man evil for evil. Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good." "Bless them that persecute you, bless and curse not; rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep." And again, "Admonish the disorderly, encourage the faint-hearted, support the weak, be long-suffering toward all." "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfil the Law of Christ." All these things lead up to that love unfeigned which "sums up" the ethical commandments of God.

Devotion to Christ, the consciousness of their high calling and of the possession of the Holy Spirit, should exercise a definite ethical effect upon the mind of true believers. They will put on "the breastplate of faith and love, and for a helmet the hope of salvation." The assurance of their faith, the conviction that "to them that love God all things work together" for ultimate good, and that "the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed," give them a wonderful power of endurance in the midst of earthly tribulation. Nay, more, they supply them with peace—"the peace of God which passeth all understanding"—with a grand content, and even with an ineffable joy. Several times over does Paul speak of his own pleasure in suffering and persecution; and it is remarkable with what emphasis he speaks of "joy" as an element in Christian character. It is the second fruit of the Spirit in that long list of which the first fruit is love, and in the moral code in the Epistle to the Romans, "joy in hope" precedes, and implies, "patience in tribulation." And we get it again among the famous paradoxes which describe the spirit in which Paul lived through his wonderful missionary life.

Since the body is the dwelling-place of the Holy Spirit,

so that each believer is himself a visible sanctuary of God, purity in body and purity in mind are the virtues which befit so high a privilege and responsibility. Paul gives to his diatribes against all sexual impurity, as well as against drunkenness, debauchery and lasciviousness, this deep spiritual foundation. The character which he seeks to train is one of simplicity, sincerity and truth. Hence his not unfrequent use of such words as "unblameable," "harmless," "sincerity," "pureness," and "simplicity" (ἄμεμπτος, ἀκέραιος, εὐλικρίνεια, ἀγνότης, ἀπλότης). These virtues are necessary for that ethical sanctification to which the new life of the believer must lead. "For God called us not for uncleanness, but in sanctification," that is, to live holy lives. The use of ἀπλότης in the four passages, 2 Cor. viii. 2, ix. 11-13, xi. 3, Rom. xii. 8, is especially striking; there must be no *Hintergedanken*, no taint of selfish motive, in the service of Christ. The whole man is required. Hence the remarkable way in which, following the Rabbinic difference between צדקה (almsgiving), and גמילות חסדים (the doing of kindness), Paul distinguishes between the higher and the lower charity: "If I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, but have not love, it profiteth me nothing."

Paul's ideal Christian must be, as he says, "wise unto that which is good, simple (ἀκέραιος) unto that which is evil," or as he elsewhere says, "in malice (κακία) a babe, but in mind a man." "With what the world terms mysticism and enthusiasm," there were united in Paul "a singular prudence and moderation" (Jowett, I., p. 364). Tenderness as well as sagacity, sympathy no less than temperance, may be discerned in his truly remarkable advice on the question of legally-forbidden foods (1 Cor. viii., x., Rom. xiv.), as well as in many scattered indications elsewhere (cf. Gal. vi. 1-4). Paul is not without his moments of improper violence, and even of unseemly imprecation, but on the whole, he was, as Coleridge has said, a great gentleman. It is noticeable that seemliness is considered a fruit of love,

and everybody quotes the phrase, "Let all things be done decently and in order." Yet while a certain grace and even pliability of character are commended (cf. 1 Cor. ix. 20-22), the believer must show firmness and immoveable constancy when principles are involved. Paul's own life testified to this need, and he gives counsel corresponding: "Be ye steadfast, immoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord." So, too, a few sentences later, at the close of the same epistle: "Watch ye, stand fast in the faith, quit you like men, be strong." To which, however, he adds, coming back once more to the sovereign principle of all, "Let all that ye do be done in love."

So far as we may gather from the six epistles, Paul's life and character corresponded in fair human measure to the ethical and religious ideal which he enjoins. A missionary life spent in what was believed to be at once the service of God and the service of man, was (I owe the idea to Dean Stanley) a new thing in the history of the world. It provided of itself, beside and above all words, a new and striking ideal of character. And are any passages in the epistles more morally moving than those in which, with pardonable self-consciousness, Paul speaks of his own labours and methods in the service of Christ? So, for example, in the 1st Corinthians, "Even unto this present hour we both hunger and thirst, and are buffeted, and have no certain dwelling-place; and we toil, working with our own hands; being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we entreat; we are made as the refuse of the world, the off-scourings of all things, even until now." Or, as he says in the second epistle, "We have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the exceeding greatness of the power may be of God, and not from ourselves; we are pressed on every side, yet not shortened; perplexed, yet not unto despair; pursued, yet not forsaken; smitten down, yet not destroyed; always bearing about in the body the dying (*νέκρωσις*) of Jesus, that the life also of Jesus may be manifested in our body." How nobly is the self-sufficiency of religion (which may be

interestingly compared with the self-sufficiency of Aristotle's Ethics) characterised in the Philippians: "I have learned in whatever state I am to be content (*αὐτάρκης εἶναι*); I know how to be abased, and I know also how to abound; in everything, and in all things, have I learned the secret (*μεμύημαι*) both to be filled and to be hungry; both to abound and to be in want. I can do all things in him that strengtheneth me." His ministration was, indeed, not worthy to be blamed, and it remains as a great religious message to us all, however much we may differ from his theories and beliefs, if so be that it was only partially tested and carried out as he himself describes: "In much patience, in afflictions, in necessities, in distresses, in strifes, in imprisonments, in tumults, in labours, in watchings, in fastings, in pureness, in knowledge, in long-suffering, in kindness, in the Holy Spirit, in love unfeigned, in the word of truth, in the power of God; by the armour of righteousness on the right hand and on the left, by glory and dishonour, by evil report and good report; as deceivers and yet true, as unknown and yet well known, as dying and behold we live, as chastened and not killed, as sorrowful yet always rejoicing, as poor yet making many rich, as having nothing and yet possessing all."

To Paul the new faith seemed to involve all virtue. Within the Christian limits there was light; without was darkness—the darkness of idolatry, of unbelief, of sin. As is so often said, the stronger the light the deeper the shadow. So it seemed to Paul, from whom a comprehensive toleration is naturally not to be expected for a moment. By the verities of the Christian faith the highest life could be lived, but by no other means. "To the father's house there are many ways." Paul could not have understood, any more than a man like Akiba could have understood, the profound truth of that simple adage. But this incapacity should not blind us to the many excellencies in the "way" of Paul.

A few words on some of these may conclude this

fragmentary and immature effort, which I can hardly think has any merit except a certain measure of impartiality. Paul's religion is based on the love of God—the love, that is, which God feels to man—and also, though in a less degree, on the love which man should feel towards God. “If any man love God, the same is known of him.” It is not easy for us to reconcile Paul's theory of redemption with this fundamental dogma of God's love ; but in the mind of Paul the one undoubtedly harmonised with and even depended on the other. Moreover, Christ's love for man and man's love for Christ were clearly connected with this relation of love between God and man. Christ's mission was as much prompted by God's mercy as by his own devotion. The religious and moral enthusiasm of Paul is also very noticeable. His perennial power over the hearts of man (although its effects may change) depends greatly upon that. In him we feel the force of a great spiritual upheaval—a new and momentous departure. A new act of the religious drama is beginning: things cannot again be quite as they were before. Paul's theory of the Law is in many ways a gross and unjust perversion of the facts. Nevertheless, be we Jews or be we Christians, we cannot but recognise that for the world at large the Law could only have been a bondage. We realise now, from a wholly different point of view, that there was a real historic truth (utterly unknown to Paul) in comparing its ceremonial enactments to the weak rudiments of lower religions. Knowing as we do that there is no written document into which the human mind as well as the human hand does not largely enter, we none of us now could fail to understand that a religious taskmaster consisting of such a document, from which there was no appeal, would be unsuited for the matured conscience of humanity. We interpret the Law ; we distinguish between what is moral and what is ritual. By the infraction of a single command which it were within his power to obey, every Jew, however disinclined he may be to acknowledge it, has tacitly put himself above the Law, and claimed for his conscience

and for his reason the right of interpretation and disobedience. He has put the spirit above the letter, and entered into the world of freedom. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." And this spiritual emancipation is historically traceable to Paul. The doctrine of that remarkable passage in the 1st Epistle to the Corinthians (ii. 10-16) contains a great truth, however useful it may be to disentangle its permanent value from its temporary form and to qualify it with saving provisos. "He that is spiritual judges all things." In one deep sense there can be nothing between the human soul and God. Each of us must fashion his own religion.

Paul's zeal for righteousness and holy living is essentially Jewish. His tremendous enthusiasm for his cause, which is at once religious and ethical, gives this zeal a glow and fervency peculiarly his own. His hatred of sin is very inspiring. Equally striking, I think, is his grasp upon the essentials of morality. There is a unity in his ethics: the virtues hang together. On one or two principles, whether religious or ethical, all seem to depend. Nor can we forget that the great Apostle of faith has yet placed faith below love. This seems the culminating proof of the fact that no trace of ethical antinomianism can be elicited from the Epistles of Paul.¹ I should like, in conclusion, to quote a story about a certain Jew which Dean Stanley has picked out of a sermon of John Wesley's. It may be specially noted that Wesley says nothing of this Jew showing any inclination to adopt the specific tenets of dogmatic Christianity. Here are his words: "Nothing is more common than to find even those who deny the authority of the Holy

¹ "It is remarkable that nearly the same words—'In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision'—occur three times, and each time with a different termination of the sentence; here (Gal. vi. 15), 'But a new creation'; at v. 6, 'But faith which worketh by love'; 1 Cor. vii. 19, 'But the keeping of the commandments of God.' So far was the Apostle from describing true religion, even when opposed to the Law, under the formula of faith only."—Jowett, I., p. 393 (cf. his note on Romans ii. 5).

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Scriptures, yet affirming, 'This is my religion: that which is described in the thirteenth chapter of the Corinthians.' Nay, even a Jew, Dr. Nunes, a Spanish physician, then settled at Savannah, in Georgia, used to say, with great earnestness, 'that Paul of Tarsus was one of the finest writers I have ever read. I wish the thirteenth chapter of his first letter to the Corinthians were wrote in letters of gold; and I wish every Jew were to carry it with him wherever he went.' He judged (and herein he certainly judged right) that this single chapter contained the whole of true religion."¹

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

¹ *Wesley's Works*, vol. vii. p. 46 (cf. Stanley's edition of the Corinthians, p. 242). The whole sermon is very interesting. It is noticeable that Wesley by anticipation strongly approves the restoration of love for charity in the R. V.
